




























Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Hinterberger, A. (2018). ‘Marked “h” for Human: Chimeric Life and the Politics of the Human’. BioSocieties,
13(2), 453-469. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41292-017-0079-7
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
Original Article
Marked ‘h’ for human: Chimeric life
and the politics of the human
Amy Hinterberger
Department of Sociology, Social Sciences Building, The University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK.
E-mail: a.hinterberger@warwick.ac.uk
Abstract Chimeric life forms constitute mergers between two or more distinct beings. This
article explores the making of interspecies mammalian chimeras in biomedical research where the
availability of human embryonic stem cells and induced pluripotent stem cells has opened the way
to radically humanize the biology of other organisms. By showing how chimeric life forms are
foundational to biology, however, I loosen the compelling grip that chimeras have as liminal and
monstrous. To the story of the chimera, this article replies with another story, that of the human as
it is differently enacted at the levels of cells, tissues and organisms. Drawing on fieldwork con-
ducted at a stem cell laboratory and farm animal research institute, the paper argues that meanings
of the human become elusive and unknown when intertwined with chimeric life. In conclusion, the
article reflects on the transforming politics of the human in biomedical research.
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Introduction
In order to dislodge us from our own species narcissism many working in critical and social
theory have accepted the premise (to some degree or another) that the human can no longer
serve as the basis and inspiration for social inquiry.1 To understand the contemporary
predicaments we find ourselves in we need to get away from the human. The life sciences
have provided potent new sources of stimulation for such movements. However, as opposed
to moving away from the human, translational biomedical research has ushered in a dazzling
array of ways to model, create and organize research around the category human.
This article investigates recent transformations in how the human is defined, approached
and governed in biomedical research by asking: what and who constitutes the human in the
making of interspecies mammalian chimera? Within the fields of stem cell science and
regenerative medicine, chimeric entities are made by inserting cells from one donor species
1 The dislocation of the human subject is not itself novel, having a long history in biological thought (e.g.
Darwin, 1991) and other areas such as psychoanalysis (e.g. Freud, 1930). Perhaps more noteworthy about
our contemporary moment then is the active and enthusiastic dislocation of the human subject seen across
the humanities and social sciences via a variety of approaches: (Appadurai, 1988; Latour, 2007; Thrift,
2008; Bennett, 2009; Braidotti, 2013).
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(such as human) into the developing embryo of another species (such as a pig). I explore how
the generation of interspecies chimeras raises both scientific and political questions about the
redefinition of human attributes, functions and processes at the molecular and cellular level.
In exploring the making of interspecies chimeric life, the article is organized around what
historian and mythographer, Marina Warner (1994, p. 4) calls a cultural kontakion, a model
of response and reply, invocation and challenge, based on the Greek antiphonal chorus sung
across a church nave. This approach (replying to one story with another) is effective at the
task of holding mythical nodes, such as the figure of the chimera, up to the light, in order to
open up a new angle of view (Warner, 1994). The first section of the paper examines the
mythic accretions gathered around the figure of the chimera and relates these to the
experimental interspecies chimeras in mice, rats and birds that emerged in late twentieth
century laboratories. These interspecies mixtures came to be known as chimeric (in direct
reference to the Chimera monster of Greek myth) and have been central to establishing
knowledge about the developmental and reproductive capacities of organisms. By showing
how these chimeric forms of life are foundational figures in biology, I seek to loosen the
compelling grip that chimeras have as liminal and monstrous.
To the story of the chimera, this article replies with another story, that of the human
research subject as it is being re-specified across cellular and molecular levels. Chimeras, I
will argue, are not so curious after all. They form a rather regular figure in biology since
its inception. Instead, it is the category of human that has become elusive and unknown
when entangled in chimeric life. Chimera-making technologies bring into question the
relationship between the plasticity of biology and the human person. The case of
interspecies mammalian chimeras presented here shows how these technologies both reify
the category human but also confound previous biological and ethical settlements about
how to approach and govern the human research subject in biomedicine. In concluding,
the article reflects on recent scholarship that calls for explicit re-engagement with the
category human in order to illuminate the politics of the human research subject in
biomedical research.
The historical and ethnographic data on which this article is based comes out of a series of
funded research projects carried out in Europe and North America which investigate recent
transformations in how the human is defined and governed in biomedicine. The analysis
presented here draws on a range of sources collected from these projects including:
interviews with scientists, ethicists and lawyers, ethnographic and site observations, media
articles, official reports and research guidelines. In northern Europe, ethnographic fieldwork
took place in a publicly funded research consortium comprising a stem cell laboratory, a
farm animal research institute and a primate research centre. In North America, laboratory
visits with stem cell scientists, along with interviews with lawyers and ethicists, took place in
major American research universities.2 The historical review presented draws on bioscien-
tific publications from the 1960s onwards that describe and report on interspecies
2 I conducted 35 interviews with stem cell scientists, veterinarians, animal husbandry experts, lawyers and
research ethics committee members. Research visits between 3 weeks to 3 months were carried out in
northern continental Europe and major US research universities. All the names of research participants
that appear in the manuscript have been anonymised.
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mammalian chimeras. In exploring the making of interspecies mammalian chimera, the aim
of this article is not to uphold particular versions of what the human means, but rather to
investigate what biomedical researchers take it to mean in their everyday practices.
She who lent her name to incongruous mixing
Who was Chimera? She was the daughter of Echida and Typhon. Echida, known in Greek
mythology as the mother of monsters was half-woman and half-snake. She was the partner
of Typhon, who was the last son of Gaia. Together Echida and Typhon brought many
famous monsters into the world, including Chimera. Written about by Homer, Chimera,
breathed fire from three heads and was ‘‘a thing of immortal make, not human, lion-fronted
and snake behind, a goat in the middle’’ (Homer, Iliad 6.179–182). She lived on the hills of
what is now south west Turkey in a series of caves. In Homer’s tale, the hero Bellerophon
kills the chimera by inserting a lump of lead into her throat where it cools, choking the
monster to death. Chimera’s fate, like many other monsters, was to meet death at the hands
of a hero, but unlike her other monster kin, such as the Sphinx, Medusa and the Cyclops,
Chimera ended up lending her name to a wide and generic concept – that of a heterogeneous
being (Bompiani, 1989; Warner, 2007, p. 243).
In lending her name to the mixing of opposing parts and to unnatural assemblages, the
term chimera has come to hold a strong purchase on social imaginations across many
cultural epochs. In her study of monsters and myth, Warner (2007, p. 241–243) explains
that since the Renaissance the word chimera has come to mean illusion itself – it is a monster
that is ‘‘both frighteningly there and yet a spectre’’. Chimera is ‘‘the ultimate monster of
monsters’’ (Warner, 1994, p. 10). From Frankenstein’s monster, to the human-like creatures
created by vivisection in the Island of Dr. Moreau, composite beings elicit both fascination
and repulsion. However, they also do more than this. This is particularly true for Chimera.
She was a remarkable monster because she is ‘‘the single character in a single story’’ who
became ‘‘the protoype of every possible composite, every hybrid’’ (Bompiani, 1989, p. 377).
The mythic accretions gathered around the term chimera have made their way deep into
biology. For example, sex differences in biology are explained through the idea that females
are cellular mosaics for X-chromosomal genes, leading to assertions that they are chimerical,
mysterious and hence, duplicitous (Richardson, 2013, p. 110). As I will show below, the grip
of the chimera on the modern imagination is evident across a range of different biological
domains of thought.
Chimerism and horizontal life
While this article focuses on the technical composition of making interspecies mammalian
chimeras, multiple forms of ‘chimeric thinking’ have increasingly become more widespread
in the biological sciences. These are part of larger practical and epistemic changes in the life
sciences themselves, what Nikolas Rose (2013, p. 19) calls an emerging style of thought
characterized by ‘‘constant transactions across the apparent boundaries of the organism that
constitute, shape and support vitality’’. Staffan Mu¨ller-Wille and Hans-Jo¨rg Rheinberger
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(2012, p. 206) argue that new approaches in biology have radicalized ‘‘the horizontalisation
of hereditarian thinking and genetic practice’’ where ‘‘the entire gene pool brought about by
evolution has become a universal tool box’’. In the contemporary life sciences, it is not just
species boundaries that have become permeable, but also organic boundaries. Readily
accepted since the nineteenth century, such assumed boundaries between microbes, plants
and animals are now subject to renegotiation (e.g. Haraway, 1991; Ingold and Palsson,
2013; Landecker, 2015). Within this milieu, chimerism has emerged as a way to understand
ourselves and other life forms (Hird, 2004; Landecker, 2007; Dupre, 2010; Margulis et al,
2011; Lappe´ and Landecker, 2015). While Mu¨ller-Wille and Rheinberger (2012, p. 206)
insist that the future implications for molecular biology adumbrated in a term like chimeric
‘‘still lie beyond reckoning’’ such a term points to new developments in approaching and
understanding hereditary materials in bioscientific research.
Drawing on forms of biological chimerism is an effective strategy for countering long-
standing assumptions about the human body which have traditionally dominated in
biomedical research. For example, in their discussion of symbiotic life, based on the work of
evolutionary theorist, Lynn Margulis, Gilbert et al, (2012, p. 325) explain that we have
never been biological individuals. Instead, humans, along with other organisms, are
composites of many species (such as microorganisms) living and developing together – to this
end, all organisms are chimeric and there are no monogenetic individuals (2012, p. 327).
Philosopher of biology, John Dupre´ (2015, p. 70), also argues that the common
understanding of an organism, truncated into the idea of one genome in one body is only
one way to think about organisms. Dupre’s argument is that we need to start thinking more
about ourselves and the living things we share our environment with as polygenomic, or in
other words, chimeric. Such arguments link to long-standing discussions in the philosophy of
biology about what constitutes an individual (see: Pradeu, 2011). Dorian Sagan (1992,
p. 364) has argued that the human body is ‘chimerical’: ‘‘Like that many-headed beast, the
microbeast of the animal cell combines into one entity bacteria that were originally freely
living, self-sufficient and metabolically distinct’’. Here the chimera is the eukaryote cell itself,
but chimeric thinking, at the heart of symbiotic theories of life, is gaining traction in a
variety of approaches that accentuate interconnected and interdependent forms of life. This
can be seen in human/microbe relations with the recent popularity of Ed Yong’s, I contain
multitudes but also in biomedical research, where human health is coming to be defined
through microbial partners (Benezra, 2016).
Chimeric life in biology represents genomic multitudes, defying conventional wisdom that
there is only one genome in one organism (or body). This is significant because Anglo-
American culture has taken the genome as a synonym for the self. Take for instance the BBC
Futures special (Robson, 2015) on chimerism which opens with the line: ‘‘You may think
your body and mind are your own. In fact, you are a fusion of many organisms - including,
potentially, another person.’’ This headline plays off the notion of merged twins in early
development within the womb, where cells from two separate embryos collaborate to make
only one individual. But does having the genetic material of a twin lost during early
development mean you are two people? Writing on the history and politics of human
chimeras in medical research, Aryn Martin (2007a, p. 205, 2007b) has pointed out just how
curious such a leap is – why is it that journalists and even scientists ‘‘have come to equate
genomes with selves and hence conclude that chimeras are more than one person’’? Such a
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leap she argues has to do with at least a half-century of gene-centric thought where we have
come to think of ourselves as beings that possess a genome (unique to ourselves), and that we
should protect this genome, sharing it only under certain conditions. Such thinking is typified
by the title, J. Craig Venter, one of the first to sequence the human genome, gives his
autobiography, A Life Decoded: My Genome, My Life (2007). However, a good decade and
a half after the Human Genome Project’s completion, the life sciences themselves stand in a
moment of uncertainty, transition, and contestation – forcing a rethinking of the genome
itself (Richardson and Stevens, 2015). In addition, there are a range of new biotechnologies,
especially those providing the generation of different kinds of stem cells, which have opened
new paths for the making of chimeras as both biological tools and for clinical application.
Experimental chimeras: technical research objects in cell and developmental
biology
If we turn to the modern laboratories of the biosciences, chimeric entities are only one kind
of mixture in a much bigger cast of characters. Chimeras exist within a broad spectrum of
related biological entities, for example hybrids. A mule is a hybrid, as it is composed of
homogenous cells that result from the fusion of an egg and a sperm of different species (a
donkey and a horse) into a single zygote. Hybrids, however, are not regarded as chimeras
because they do not contain genetically distinct cell populations. In chimeras, cells keep their
distinct genetic identity. The sheep-goat chimera (or ‘geep’) is a good example of this.
Created in 1984, this animal chimera had cells from both goat and sheep and thus could be
used to test the effect of chemicals on both animals (Fehilly et al, 1984).
The systematic study of chimeric mammals began in the 1960s with mice. The mouse,
wrote Andrzej K. Tarkowski (1998, p. 904) is ‘‘the unquestionable leader and hero among
experimental mammalian chimeras’’. Tarkowski oversaw the first birth of these hero mice in
1961 in the Department of Zoology at what is now Bangor University in Wales:
At that time, the idea of making one mammalian individual by aggregating two
cleaving embryos must have looked rather preposterous and later I often wondered
why Professor Rogen F. Brambell, under whose supervision I worked had accepted this
and other crazy projects which I proposed to carry out in his laboratory (1998: 903).
These early chimeras were made by removing the thick transparent membrane
surrounding two mammalian ovum and pushing the sticky embryos together, which then
merged to form a single chimeric embryo. Tarkowski combined embryos from albino mice
and embryos from another coloured strain, and examination of the retinas of these mice
yielded morphological evidence of chimerism.
The term chimaera was used by Tarkowski in his 1961 paper, in contrast to Beatrice
Mintz, another scientist, who separately, but at the same time as Tarkowski, created mice
derived from embryo aggregation (Tarkowski, 1961; Mintz, 1967). Reflecting on the
creation of these experimental mammals some 37 years after their initial birth, Tarkowski
(1998, p. 904) suggests that such creatures were: ‘‘in a way a bow and a tribute paid by
experimental embryology to ancient mythology which created monsters of dual, triple or
even multiple origin’’. He defends the adoption of the ‘‘mythological term’’ chimera by
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embryologists, pointing any doubters to the work of bird embryologists who can ‘‘produce
chimeras closely resembling the mythological creatures, for instance an embryo with a chick
head and neck on a quail body’’ (1998, p. 905).
It was during the 1970s that biologists developed chimeras to study cell lineage and cell
fate during embryonic development. The late Anne McLaren began her 1976 book
Mammalian Chimaeras by noting how biology, as well as mythology, provides examples of
‘‘the strange and often intimate associations between different species’’ (1). Her introduction
notes that only a few dozen people in the world, who have worked with experimental mice
chimeras, will share her enthusiasm for:
their beauty, their unexpectedness, the insight they provide into old questions, and
above all new questions, questions that one never dreamt existed in the days when an
individual had two parents only (1976: 2).
For McLaren, experimental mice chimeras could be used to explore ideas about generation,
reproduction and evolution because they were composite animals in which different cell
populations are derived from one or more fertilized eggs. For experimental embryology,
chimeras provided a method to understand and trace two cell populations in the fate of
tissues and cell linage in development. For developmental genetics, chimeras provided
another method to see how genetically different cells collaborate to form an adult animal. In
1976, McLaren was the sole author of Mammalian Chimaeras, but in 1984 she published
another book on Chimeras in Developmental Biology with the biologist, Nicole Le Douarin,
who developed chicken and quail chimeras (Douarin and McLaren, 1984). This collection
had 21 authors, signifying the fast and multidirectional development of experimental
chimeras in both mammals and birds.
Along with experimental embryology and developmental biology, transplantation biology
relied heavily on chimeric entities. In the twentieth century, the mouse body became the host
for many materials, especially in studies of immunological tolerance.3 Using mice to foster
human cells in a wide variety of contexts underwent a further revolution with the development
of severe combined immunodeficiency (SCID) mice as a model organism (McCune et al,
1988). These mice are born with no immune system and are routinely used in cell
transplantation research and studying the effects of disease on mammalian systems. SCID mice
are a naturally occurring strain of mouse, a mouse mutant that has no human genes added.4
The SCID mouse, with its capacity for humanisation is a living, integrated systems for
transplantation biology, along with testing chemical compounds (Davies, 2012). Such living,
integrated systems have now moved far beyond mice, with the development of neural,
embryonic and germline chimeras that integrate human cells and tissues in a wide range of
other animals (e.g. Povlsen et al, 1974; Ourednik et al, 2001; Nagano et al, 2002).
Chimeras continue to be used as a tool for biological knowledge. For example, one
standard method for testing whether human embryonic stem cells are pluripotent is to inject
them into immune-deficient mice, and see whether they give rise to a tumour that has all
three embryonic germ layers. Researchers at Harvard’s Stem Cell Institute were thus slightly
3 Peter Medawar transformed the practice of modern medicine through experiments on the immunological
response of successful skin transplantation between different strains of mice and how ‘foreign’ antigens
could be perceived as ‘self’ (Billingham et al, 1953). This work is also discussed in Landecker, 2007.
4 Humans also suffer from severe combined immunodeficiency where it is colloquially known as ‘bubble
boy’ disease.
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perplexed when a newly formed ethics committee, charged with overseeing human stem cell
research, asked them to provide justification that this test did not endow ‘human like’
capacities in the mice they were using for this test of pluripotency. The group published a
response to this question in the journal Cell Stem Cell, arguing that while technically doing
such a test does create a ‘human-animal chimera’, it is not one that has human-like capacities
and as such should be under the jurisdiction of animal care and use committees and exempt
from formal review by the stem cell research oversight process that has recently begun to
take root in the USA (Lensch et al, 2007).
While the chimera has a long history as a fantastical entity, the twentieth century history of
biology shows how it has supported the making of the factual. In this way, the chimera has a
double role in biology. It continues to represent, what Warner (2007, p. 243) calls the
‘‘fascination with the fantastic’’, but it has also provided the grounds to establish the facts and
basis of reproduction and embryonic development. In this way, chimeras have played a
fundamental role in shaping howwe come to think about ourselves, and other organisms. In the
spirit of Warner’s method then, if the chimera is the technical and conceptual response to the
demands of contemporary biomedical research, what kind of reply is invited by the figure of the
human, to which Foucault (1970) argued, was the unspoken premise of much modern
knowledge?
Making mammalian interspecies chimeras
Researchers working on the making of mammalian interspecies chimera are at the forefront
of new approaches that combine fundamental biology and clinical application for human
health. These are made by taking donor stem cells (for example, human donor cells) and
implanting them into a pre-natal host embryo from another animal. While researchers have
been looking at ways to produce human tissues for transplant for a long time, the recent
successful growth of a rat pancreas in a mouse galvanized those working on interspecies
chimera. In 2010, a research team reported on how they injected reprogrammed rat stem
cells into mouse embryos where the gene for regulating pancreatic development had been
deleted (Kobayashi et al, 2010). Some of the mice born survived into adulthood with
functional pancreases that were almost completely composed of rat cells.
When I visited a consortium of European researchers working in regenerative medicine
this paper, along with a similar one using pigs (Matsunari et al, 2013) was mentioned
numerous times to me in discussions as a proof of concept for potentially cultivating human
organs in other animals. The research consortium was comprised of stem cell laboratories
and a farm animal institute for genetic research. Similar to others working in this field, these
researchers sought to mix human stem cells into very early pig embryos and let them develop
with idea of creating a ‘bespoke pig’ with a human organ that is genetically identical to an
existing intended human recipient. By adding human donor cells into a developing embryo
of a pig, which had been edited to have certain developmental pathways ‘knocked out’, the
human cells would essentially fill in the gap (like the mouse with the rat pancreas). The
creation of a pig with a human organ that is genetically identical and immunologically
compatible with an existing intended human recipient would solve the problem of organ
scarcity. There would also be no need for patients to have immunosuppressive treatment.
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After all, the organ would already be their own. Such a chimeric animal (named as such
because it would be a single organism composed of genetically distinct cells) has not yet been
fully realized, but a range of foundational forms of research and proof of concept work are
underway bringing human and non-human biological materials together across molecular,
cellular and organismal levels.
At the stem cell lab some of this work involves the cultivation of human heart cells. During
one of my laboratory visits, Sophie, who leads a project on bioanalytical techniques for tissue
engineering and stem cell technologies, invited me to see these cells. Once in her lab, amid the
din of extractor fans, she opened an incubator, pulled out a dish marked with ‘h’ for human
and placed it under a microscope. Leaning in for a look, I saw small groupings of cells
pulsating. Surprised at this movement, I pulled back. Sophie smiled and explained that these
pulsating cells are cardiomyocytes. They form the muscle cells of our hearts and by pulsating
the cells pump blood through our bodies, keeping us alive. These beating clumps were special
because they were not always human heart cells. While they were always of human origin, (a
human donor gave the original material) they were originally blood cells. These donor cells
were then induced into a pluripotent state, a state where given the right kind of conditions,
cells can be transformed into almost any kind of cell in our bodies.5
Once the human cells are cultivated, other lab members inject these materials into mice in
order to test out ideas for cardiac tissue repair. Unlike some other vertebrates, who can
generate their hearts after injury, the adult human heart has little capacity for regeneration.
Putting human cells into the hearts of mice, however, takes a great amount of surgical skill.
Mice hearts are small and beat fast. From their experiments, the researchers have concluded
that the engineered human heart cells cannot really cope on a mouse heart. The mouse heart
beats at 500 times a minute and a human heart at 60. Because of this, the tiny mouse heart
expels the human cells from the target areas. The injection of human cells into mice results in
a chimera – an organism that contains cells, which have different DNA from two separate
origins. Now these particular animals’ lives are short-lived, they are but momentary
chimeras. After one to 2 weeks, the researchers sacrifice the mice to look at where and how
the implanted cells are functioning.
Returning the pulsating cells to the incubator, Sophie pulled out another dish. This dish
had a small platform with two titanium pegs on each end. Between the pegs, no bigger than
my pinky nail was something pink. While I’m looking through the microscope, Sophie
explained to me that I was watching the cultivated human heart cells organize themselves
into a piece of tissue. The tissue beats in the dish. The metal pegs, once connected to a
bioreactor, monitor the strength of the tissue in terms of how it stretches and beats. To make
a bigger piece of tissue the lab members would have to start with more cells. Tissue is not
grown, but rather assembled by the cells themselves.
Most of the basic science of developing and engineering different stem cell types is done at
this laboratory. However, Frederic, the laboratory director explained that undertaking
interspecies chimera research requires not just basic science but also the expertise of
clinicians, surgeons, animal husbandry experts, biomedical engineers and chemists. While
dish models of cells are a vital component of the project, Frederic remarked that ‘‘we cannot
5 John Gurdon and Shinya Yamanaka were awarded a Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2012 for
the discovery that mature cells can be reprogrammed to become pluripotent (Gurdon, 1962; Takahashi
and Yamanaka, 2006).
Hinterberger
460  2017 The Author(s). 1745-8552 BioSocieties Vol. 13, 2, 453–469
make functional organs in a dish’’. The dishes marked with ‘h’ for human are limited to
making different cell types and engineering tissues. This is where the idea of the chimera
comes in – Frederic explained that non-human–animal bodies might be a solution to the
challenge of generating the complex cellular structures of organs. As opposed to the dish
with two titanium pegs holding the human heart tissue in place and placed in the bioreactor,
an animal host would constitute the biologically active environment for tissue and organ
development.
The move from modelling human material in a dish to cultivating tissues or a whole organ
of one species in the body of another greatly expands the technical and practical
considerations of the consortium’s research project. The majority of work on mammalian
interspecies chimeras has been done in mice and rats. Humans differ considerably from mice
and rats in embryo size, speed of development and gestational period. Such differences mean
that researchers need larger animal hosts that share more similarities with humans in terms
of organ size, anatomy and reproduction. Pigs, sheep and monkeys are the animals that more
closely align with humans.
In stem cell labs however, large animals such as pigs, are not part of the technical
infrastructures. Given this, Frederic, Sophie and the other stem cell researchers collaborate
with a nearby farm animal research institute for access to pigs and knowledge about their
use as experimental animals. Pigs are ideal for their research, Frederic explained because
physiologically they are similar to humans (in principle it is only non-human primates that
are more similar). The pig also reproduces well and relatively fast which is important if you
want organs. Stefan, the director of the farm animal research institute, described the role of
the pig in the chimera project as ‘‘a type of living bioreactor’’. However, Stefan who is a
world leading expert on pigs as experimental animals, explained there are many challenges
with using pigs in this type of research. One significant problem was what he called ‘‘the
reign of the mouse’’. As the history of experimental mammalian chimeras shows (remember
Tarkowski’s ‘hero mice’) the mouse is an extremely well-defined model organism in basic
science. Whereas the genetics, reproductive and developmental pathways of the mouse are
well established, in the pig they are not. For example, the mouse genome was sequenced in
2002 and the pig genome in 2012. While the first embryonic stem cell lines were derived
from mice in the early 1980s, researchers are still struggling to produce pig embryonic stem
cells that are pluripotent.
The making of interspecies mammalian chimeras then requires much more research on
the functional biology of the pig despite the impetus of the research being based on
improving human health. This dilemma faced by the researchers mirrors the history of
cell culture and stem cell biology more broadly. In her account of how cells came to live
separately from the bodies they originally came from, Hannah Landecker (2007, p. 223)
shows how ‘‘developments with animal matter provided the material and conceptual
infrastructure for later experiments with human matter’’. Her argument shows how if we
only focus on human material we can easily miss the overarching technical and
conceptual approaches of biology that make work on human biological material possible
in the first place.
Not only does the work on human biological material often come at the end of the
research, in many cases other species are used as proxies to predict how human material
behaves outside the human body. While the desired goal of making interspecies mammalian
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chimera is to insert human cells into a developing pig embryo, the research consortium was
not actually using human cells. Instead, they were using cell lines from rhesus monkeys as a
proxy for human cells. This was because the researchers were concerned about what, Felix,
another member of the stem cell team aptly referred to as ‘‘unclear chimerisms’’. When the
cells of one donor species are inserted into a developing host embryo it is extremely difficult
to know where those cells are going to populate in the host animal. The concern for these
researchers (and for all those engaged in this kind of research)6 is that human cells could
contribute not just to the targeted organ in the host animal, but provide potential gamete
and neural contributions – resulting, for example, in a pig with human brain tissue. At this
stage it is very difficult to control and predict how and where human cells will populate in
another species. This is the problem of ‘unclear chimerisms’, or what a more recent
publication on mammalian interspecies chimera called ‘‘off-target’’ humanized tissue (Wu
et al, 2016, p. 56).
This problem of unclear chimerisms, or off-target humanization illuminates the
paradoxical status of human biological material that I repeatedly encountered in fieldwork.
Making other entities more human (or human-like) is at once desirable (a pig with a
functional human organ to save a human life) but can simultaneously be an ethical
abomination (a pig with a human brain). As research moves from dishes marked with ‘h’ for
human into more intricate material entanglements with other species involving organs and
bodies, the relationship between the plasticity of biology and the human person comes into
question. To this extent, chimeric forms of life are harbingers of anxiety, especially when
they contain human biological material.
Returning to Landecker (2007, p. 233) however, before we exclaim over the potential for
new biological technologies to transform or impact what it means to be human, we first must
‘‘consider how biotechnology changes what it means to be biological’’, and by extension of
that, what it means to be human. When it comes to the question of the human in biological
life, Landecker (2007, p. 235) formulates the central question this way: ‘‘what is the social
and cultural task of being biological entities – being simultaneously biological things and
human persons – when ‘the biological’ is fundamentally plastic?’’. Landecker’s question
requires us to consider not just the fundamental plasticity of biology, but also this category
6 For example, in late September 2015, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the United States declared
a moratorium on funding chimeric research where human stem cells are inserted into very early embryos
from other animals. However, similar to other instances where federal research monies were removed from
controversial research (e.g. human embryonic stem cell lines), such research can continue, but with private
monies. The moratorium was met with scepticism and criticism of researchers working in this domain
who, in a letter to Science, argued that such a moratorium impeded the progress of regenerative medicine
(Sharma et al, 2015). In 2016, the NIH announced that it would replace the moratorium with a new kind
of review for specific types of chimera research, including experiments where human stem cells are mixed
with non-human vertebrate embryos and for studies that introduce human cells into the brains of
mammals (except rodents, which will be exempt from extra review). These experiments will go to an
internal National Institutes of Health steering committee of scientists, ethicists, and animal welfare experts
that will consider factors such as the type of human cells, how they will populate in non-human organisms,
and whether they may change an animal’s behaviour or appearance.
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of the human person. The experiences of those working in the research consortium can attest
to the fundamental plasticity of biology. This plasticity however, also raises the spectre of
unclear chimerisms and brings into question what constitutes a human person.
Human persons and unclear chimerisms
The research practices described above reflect how translational biomedical research further
opens up potentials for chimeric life as areas such as genomics, animal models, structural
biology, biochemistry and molecular biology advance new understandings about the diseases
and illnesses that break down our bodies. The problem of unclear chimerisms identified by
members of the research consortium are connected to a wider set of deliberations taking place
across stemcell science about themeaning and significance of humanbiologicalmaterial and its
connection to the human person. For example, over the last 10 years, almost all countries that
invest in life sciences research have issued detailed reports on the problems that chimera-based
research brings to law, ethics and regulation (e.g. Academy ofMedical Sciences, 2011; Danish
Council of Ethics, 2007; Singapore Bioethics Committee, 2008). The arresting similarity
between these texts is the manner in which the human research subject is contrasted to the
animal. Humans are biological animals, but they are not considered so in the juridical
structures governing biological research (see Hinterberger, 2016).
While the ontological premises of biology may be undergoing major revision (Mu¨ller-Wille
and Rheinberger, 2012; Meloni, 2016), so too are the institutional structures within which
researcher’s practice. These changes involve not only reformulations of public/private
relationships, regulatory structures and institutional organization, but alsochangingapproaches
to what andwho counts as a human research subject (Haraway, 1997; Rabinow, 2002; Sunder
Rajan, 2006; Rose, 2007; Pa´lsson, 2007; Cooper, 2011). This is the world of translational
research (SunderRajan andLeonelli, 2013). In theUnited States, Embryonic StemCellResearch
Oversight Committees form part of these new regulatory structures. These committees are
similar to institutional review boards found at most major American research universities.
However, unlike institutional reviewboards,where there is a relatively clear subject outlined for
protection, (the human subject) those sitting on oversight committees have been asked to
deliberate on the extent towhich experimentsmay give ‘‘human contributions’’ to other animals
(National Academy of Sciences, 2010, p. 32). That is, if a scientist’s work uses humanmaterials,
such as embryos, or stemcells derived fromhumanembryos, this committeemust investigate the
extent to which the humanisation of other life forms may occur within proposed experiments.
There are no established metrics of humanization at molecular and cellular levels. While
visiting a major American research university, with its own oversight committee, I met a
lawyer who told me about an informal conversation he had with a colleague. This colleague,
a senior bioethicist, was expressing frustration at the hyperbolic modes of debate
accompanying human embryonic stem cell research and the making of chimeras. He said:
‘‘stem cells are a smudge. That’s it’’. This lawyer, though feeling similarly tired by the
debates, but less reductive, replied with this creative prompt ‘‘Well, if they are just a smudge,
would you eat them?’’ His colleague did not want to take up this challenge of cellular
gastronomy. The lawyer replied ‘‘so then stem cells are something…’’ The lawyer told me
this story because he wanted to make a point - that human cells were not merely a smudge,
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but nor did they fit into the neat divisions that accompanied his professional world which
was divided into human research subjects, animals and human embryos.
The humanized forms of life now under deliberation in most advanced liberal democracies
separate from the human body, human properties, such as cognition, and assess how and
whether they might turn up in chimeric life. Take, for example, mice with human brain cells.
Researchers at the University of Rochester (Han et al, 2013) created mice with human glial
cells in their brains (glial cells support neurons, the ‘thinking’ cells of the brain). These
humanized mice are described in publications as smarter than their regular brained mice
counterparts. At the same time, however, the researchers argue that there is nothing
particularly human about these mice with human glial cells in their brains:
This does not provide the animals with additional capabilities that could in any way be
ascribed or perceived as specifically human. Rather, the human cells are simply
improving the efficiency of the mouse’s own neural networks. It’s still a mouse
(Goldman quoted in Loike, 2015).
The question, however, of whether or not interspecies chimera may retain behavioural traits
characteristic of the donor species - in this case human cognative capacities in a mouse -
remains unclear and under deliberation amongst researchers (Wu et al, 2016, p. 51). Mark
Dowie (2004) has previously written that, at times, these deliberations mirror the famous
phrase issued by United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart to describe his threshold
test for obscenity in pornography: ‘‘I’ll know it when I see it’’.
While the category of the human research subject has a distinct and fairly recent
genealogy in contemporary Euro-America (Stark, 2011), it appears that changes are afoot in
understandings of what this subject materially constitutes. Key faculty involved in ethical
and regulatory oversight at one of America’s top research universities are debating the status
of human stem cells by considering whether they would ingest them. So called ‘smart mice’
with humanized brains are smarter than regular mice, but have nothing specifically human
about them. All this suggests there may be some strange times ahead. What is emerging as
curious and, often unknown, are not the liminal creations of biology typified by chimeric
life, but idea of human itself. Chimeras, it turns out, are less curious than they first appear,
forming a rather regular figure in biology. Instead, it is the category of human that is
becoming increasingly elusive, fragile and unknown as it becomes entangled in chimeric life.
The politics of the human in bioscience
We can begin to draw out the significance of chimera-making technologies in bioscience by
examining literature which explicitly argues for a renewed engagement with the human. This
literature, which includes, but also extends beyond the social studies of bioscience, cuts
across the humanities and social sciences, emphasizing our shared vulnerability and
precariousness with other living beings (Phillips, 2015; Braidotti and Gilroy, 2016; Cornell
and Seely, 2016). In explicitly focusing on how some human lives come to be valued more
than others it places the question of the human at the heart of politics – rubbing up against
what Paul Gilroy (2014, p. 23) calls ‘‘today’s assertively post-human mood’’. For Gilroy
(2011, p. 10), the widespread hasty dismissal of humanism trending in academia needs to be
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met with ‘‘an obligation to re-engage/re-enchant the human’’ – one that places an analysis of
racial hierarchy at its centre. In feminist science studies, Deboleena Roy and Banu
Subramaniam (2016, p. 34) have remarked that while they do not argue for the centrality of
the human, the post-humanist slant under which some feminist uses of biology are now
proceeding, may not fully situate biologies ‘‘in their political and historical context’’. While
differing in emphasis and analytical plans for action, these literatures offer space to reflect on
the transforming politics of the human in bioscience.
One significant insight they offer is that biological metaphors or activities cannot provide
the basis for renewed socialities or political commitments (e.g. Phillips discussion of
humanism and posthumanism, 2015: 107–136). Along these lines, Drucilla Cornell and
Stephen Seely (2016, p. 210) argue for less time being spent on ‘‘de-bunking ‘the human’’’
and more attention to the ‘undertaking of Man’ through a new collective praxis of being
human. They sketch out this collective praxis of being human through the work of
philosopher, Syliva Wynter. Drawing on figures such as Aime´ Ce´saire, Franz Fanon and
Edward Said – who all held commitments to humanism, Wynter develops a critical
genealogy of colonial institutions and the human in Western thought which leaves behind
‘Man’ but still sees a future that requires and ethically demands new expressions of
humanness. Her work draws out the contradictory force that biological thought has in
relation to the human. Darwin dispelled the premise that humans had any God-given
attributes that separated them from other animals. Yet, this position of continuity with all
organic life went hand in hand with the development of divisions between those who were
‘‘selected by evolution’’ and those ‘‘dyselected by evolution’’ so as to classify humans through
hereditary variation and racial orders (Wynter in Scott 2000, p. 204). A politics of the
human then means making more explicit ‘our genres of being human’ that are not
necessarily connected to biological notions of ‘Man’ (Wynter in Scott, 2000).
Recent work in the social studies of the biosciences have illuminated collective practices of
being human that differ substantially from the traditional assumptions about what underpins
a human person (often seen as the capacity formoral reasoning). Across different research sites
(a neonatal ward, a nursing home and pig laboratory), Svendsen et al (2017) chart numerous
collective practices of doing the human that move beyond static ideas of human persons.
Through their detailed ethnographic study, they show how ‘‘border, edge and maintenance
practices in doing the human force open our all to generic western category of ‘the human’’’
(2017). Similar to Svendsen et al.’s focus on enacting the human, this account of making
interspecies mammalian chimeras shows how understandings of humanness or human
attributes, particularly at the level of cells and tissues does not take us beyond the human, but
rather into the heart of how this category continues to shape research and elicit new forms of
deliberation. Such reengagements with the makings and doings of the human offer the social
studies of bioscience tangible ways to explore what Jamie Lorimer (2016, p. 57) has recently
called ‘‘more-than-human, but not posthuman’’ achievements.
Engaging with the technical and ethical work required to maintain boundaries around the
human illuminates the historical and institutional specificities that underpin the human
research subject in biomedical science. Charis Thompson (2013) has charted the ‘‘ethical
choreography’’ required to maintain boundaries around the human research subject as it
becomes entangled in stem cell science. The constitution of the human research subject, she
explains, is rooted in modern bioethics and can be dated from the Nuremberg trials where
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doctors were accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity: ‘‘Nazi Germany remains
the moral nadir and the geopolitical locus of much of the bioethical imaginary’’ (2013,
pp. 191–199). The kinds of juridical structures that undergirded this human subject however
also brought into being a new kind of experimental subject, specifically the ‘‘non-human
animal’’ as the mandatory ‘‘substitutive research subject’’ (Thompson, 2013, p. 191). With
the making of interspecies chimera, this imaginary gives way to practical realities in the
laboratory for the experimental animals who are scarified because of substitutive research
logics. The fieldwork recounted in this article shows how these substitutive logics undergird
research – when the dish can no longer provide the infrastructure for modelling complex
organs an animal host body becomes a living bioreactor. Where the use of human cells
may be prohibited, monkey cells are used as a proxy for what human cells will do.
Holding the figure of the chimera up to the light illuminates long-standing interconnec-
tions between scientific and mythical modes of thought. As one form of chimeric life,
interspecies mammalian chimera usher in new conversations about what and who
constitutes the human in biomedical research. The result is that substantive notions of
humanness, rather than being dissolved, are being re-articulated in the biosciences. The
redefinition of human functions and processes, particularly at the level of cells and tissues,
sits uneasily with the assumption that substantive notions of the human, with all the
documented ways such assertions have led to hierarchical ideas, are part of our historical
past. Experimental chimeras are part of the post-genomic era which has ushered in a
reformulation of life processes and offered new definitions of what constitutes an organism.
Yet scientists are being asked by regulators and governments to identify and isolate possible
human contributions to other animals and entities. In contemporary politics, it’s perhaps not
that the boundaries between human and non-human are blurring - rather the forms of life
given value and recognition in these opposing peripheries are undergoing transformation.
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